This document suggests general architectural and policy questions to be addressed in our work in the IETF. We note that this document contains questions to be addressed, as opposed to guidelines or architectural principles to be followed.
Introduction
This document suggests general architectural and policy questions to be addressed in our work in the IETF. This document contains questions to be addressed, as opposed to guidelines or architectural principles to be followed. This is somewhat similar to the "Security Considerations" currently required in IETF documents [RFC2316] .
This document is motivated in part by concerns of a growing lack of coherence in the overall Internet architecture. We have moved from a world of a single, coherent architecture designed by a small group of people, to a world of a complex, intricate architecture to address a wide-spread and heterogeneous environment. Because individual pieces of the architecture are often designed by sub-communities, with each sub-community having its own set of interests, it is necessary to pay increasing attention to how each piece fits into the larger picture, and to consider how each piece is chosen. For example, it is unavoidable that each of us is inclined to solve a problem at the layer of the protocol stack and using the tools that we understand the best; that does not necessarily mean that this is the most appropriate layer or set of tools for solving this problem in the long-term.
Relationship to "Architectural Principles of the Internet"
RFC 1958 [RFC1958] outlines some architectural principles of the Internet, as "guidelines that have been found useful in the past, and that may be useful to those designing new protocols or evaluating such designs." An example guideline is that "it is also generally felt that end-to-end functions can best be realized by end-to-end protocols." Similarly, an example design issue from [RFC1958] is that "heterogeneity is inevitable and must be supported by design."
In contrast, this document serves a slightly different purpose, by suggesting additional architectural questions to be addressed. Thus, one question suggested in this document is the following: "Is this proposal the best long-term solution to the problem? If not, what are the long-term costs of this solution, in terms of restrictions on future development, if any?" This question could be translated to a roughly equivalent architectural guideline, as follows: "Identify whether the proposed protocol is a long-term solution or a short-term solution, and identify the long-term costs and the exit strategy for any short-term solutions."
In contrast, other questions are more open-ended, such as the question about robustness: "How robust is the protocol, not just to the failure of nodes, but also to compromised or malfunctioning nodes, imperfect or defective implementations, etc?" As a community, we are still learning about the degree of robustness that we are able to build into our protocols, as well as the tools that are available to ensure this robustness. Thus, there are not yet clear architectural guidelines along the lines of "Ensure that your protocol is robust against X, Y, and Z." In this section we list some questions to ask in designing protocols. Each question is discussed in more depth in the rest of this paper. We aren't suggesting that all protocol design efforts should be required to explicitly answer all of these questions; some questions will be more relevant to one document than to another. We also aren't suggesting that this is a complete list of architectural concerns.
Justifying the Solution: Later, RFC 2475 on "An Architecture for Differentiated Services" proposed a scalable, service differentiation architecture that differs from the previously-defined architecture for integrated services, the document also had to clearly justify the requirements for this new architecture, and compare the proposed architecture to other possible approaches [RFC2475] . Similarly, when the Assured Forwarding [RFC2597] and Expedited Forwarding [RFC2598] Per-Hop Behaviors of differentiated services were proposed, each service required a justification of the need for that service in the Internet.
Interactions between Layers.
Questions: Why are you proposing a solution at this layer of the protocol stack, rather than at another layer? Are there solutions at other layers of the protocol stack as well?
Is this an appropriate layer in terms of correctness of function, data integrity, performance, ease of deployment, the diagnosibility of failures, and other concerns?
What are the interactions between layers, if any?
5.1. Case study: Endpoint Congestion Management.
The goal of the Congestion Manager in Endpoint Congestion Management is to allow multiple concurrent flows with the same source and destination address to share congestion control state [RFC3124] . There has been a history of proposals for multiplexing flows at different levels of the protocol stack; proposals have included adding multiplexing at the HTTP (WebMux) and TCP (TCP Control Blocks) layers, as well as below TCP (the Congestion Manager) [Multiplexing] .
However, the 1989 article on "Layered Multiplexing Considered Harmful" suggests that "the extensive duplication of multiplexing functionality across the middle and upper layers is harmful and should be avoided" [T89] . Thus, one of the key issues in providing mechanisms for multiplexing flows is to determine which layer of the protocol stack is most appropriate for providing this functionality. The natural tendency of each researcher is generally to add functionality at the layer that they know the best; this does not necessarily result in the most appropriate overall architecture.
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Discussion: The End-to-End Argument
The classic 1984 paper on "End-To-End Arguments In System Design" [SRC84] begins a discussion of where to place functions among modules by suggesting that "functions placed at low levels of a system may be redundant or of little value when compared with the cost of providing them at that low level. Examples discussed in the paper include bit error recovery, security using encryption, duplicate message suppression, recovery from system crashes, and delivery acknowledgement. Low level mechanisms to support these functions are justified only as performance enhancements." We cite this not as a rule that cannot be violated, but as a guide to some of the issues to be considered in choosing the appropriate layer for a function.
Case study: Layering Applications on Top of HTTP.
There has been considerable interest in layering applications on top of HTTP [RFC3205] . Reasons cited include compatibility with widelydeployed browsers, the ability to reuse client and server libraries, the ability to use existing security mechanisms, and the ability to traverse firewalls. As RFC 3205 discusses, "the recent interest in layering new protocols over HTTP has raised a number of questions when such use is appropriate, and the proper way to use HTTP in contexts where it is appropriate." Thus, RFC 3205 addresses not only the benefits of layering applications on top of HTTP, but also evaluates the additional complexity and overhead of layering an application on top of HTTP, compared to the costs of introducing a special-purpose protocol.
The web page on "References on Layering and the Internet Architecture" has pointers to additional papers discussing general layering issues in the Internet architecture [Layering] .
Long-term vs. Short-term Solutions
Questions: Is this proposal the best long-term solution to the problem?
If not, what are the long-term costs of this solution, in terms of restrictions on future development, if any? What are the requirements for the development of longer-term solutions?
6.1. Case study: Traversing NATs.
In order to address problems with NAT middleboxes altering the external address of endpoints, various proposals have been made for mechanisms where an originating process attempts to determine the address (and port) by which it is known on the other side of a NAT. This would allow an originating process to be able to use address data in the protocol exchange, or to advertise an external address from which it will receive connections.
The IAB in [UNSAF] has outlined reasons why these proposals can be considered at best as short-term fixes to specific problems, and the specific issues to be carefully evaluated before standardizing such proposals. These issues include the identification of the limitedscope problem to be fixed, the description of an exit strategy for the short-term solution, and the description of the longer-term problems left unsolved by the short-term solution.
General Robustness Questions
Questions: How robust is the protocol, not just to the failure of nodes, but also to compromised or malfunctioning nodes, imperfect or defective implementations, etc?
Does the protocol take into account the realistic conditions of the current or future Internet (e.g., packet drops and packet corruption; packet reordering; asymmetric routing; etc.)?
7.1. Discussion: Designing for Robustness.
Robustness has long been cited as one of the overriding goals of the Internet architecture [Clark88] . The robustness issues discussed in [Clark88] largely referred to the robustness of packet delivery even in the presence of failed routers; today robustness concerns have widened to include a goal of robust performance in the presence of a wide range of failures, buggy code, and malicious actions.
As [ASSW02] argues, protocols need to be designed somewhat defensively, to maximize robustness against inconsistencies and errors.
[ASSW02] discusses several approaches for increasing robustness in protocols, such as verifying information whenever possible; designing interfaces that are conceptually simple and therefore less conducive to error; protecting resources against attack or overuse; and identifying and exposing errors so that they can be repaired.
Techniques for verifying information range from verifying that acknowledgements in TCP acknowledge data that was actually sent, to providing mechanisms for routers to verify information in routing messages.
Techniques for protecting resources against attack range from
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preventing "SYN flood" attacks by designing protocols that don't allocate resources for a single SYN packet, to partitioning resources (e.g., preventing one flow or aggregate from using all of the link bandwidth).
Case Study: Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN).
The Internet is based on end-to-end congestion control, and historically the Internet has used packet drops as the only method for routers to indicate congestion to the end nodes. ECN [RFC3168] is a recent addition to the IP architecture to allow routers to set a bit in the IP packet header to inform end-nodes of congestion, instead of dropping the packet.
The first, Experimental specification of ECN [RFC2481] contained an extensive discussion of the dangers of a rogue or broken router "erasing" information from the ECN field in the IP header, thus preventing indications of congestion from reaching the end-nodes. To add robustness, the standards-track specification [RFC3168] specified an additional codepoint in the IP header's ECN field, to use for an ECN "nonce". The development of the ECN nonce was motivated by earlier research on specific robustness issues in TCP [SCWA99] . RFC 3168 explains that the addition of the codepoint "is motivated primarily by the desire to allow mechanisms for the data sender to verify that network elements are not erasing the CE codepoint, and that data receivers are properly reporting to the sender the receipt of packets with the CE codepoint set, as required by the transport protocol." Supporting mechanisms for the ECN nonce are needed in the transport protocol to ensure robustness of delivery of the ECN-based congestion indication.
In contrast, a more difficult and less clear-cut robustness issue for ECN concerns the differential treatment of packets in the network by middleboxes, based on the TCP header's ECN flags in a TCP SYN packet [F02] . [RFC2914] discusses the potential for congestion collapse if flows are not using end-to-end congestion control in a time of high congestion. For example, if a new transport protocol was proposed that did not use end-to-end congestion control, it might be easy to show that a flow using the new transport protocol would perform quite well as long as all of the competing flows in the network were using end-to-end congestion control. To fully evaluate the new transport protocol, it is necessary to look at performance when many flows are competing, all using the new transport protocol. If all of the competing flows were using the more aggressive transport protocol in a time of high congestion, the result could be a tragedy of the commons, with many links busy carrying packets that will only be dropped downstream.
Balancing Competing Interests
Question: Does the protocol protect the interests of competing parties (e.g., not only end-users, but also ISPs, router vendors, software vendors, or other parties)? Is the design modularized to allow competing interests to play out, while also isolating "tussles" and preventing them from spilling out into unrelated areas?
9.1. Discussion: balancing competing interests
[CWSB02] discusses the role that competition between competing interests plays in the evolution of the Internet, and takes the position that the role of Internet protocols is to design the playing field in this competition, rather than to pick the outcome. The IETF has long taken the position that it can only design the protocols, and that often two competing approaches will be developed, with the marketplace left to decide between them [A02] .
An example cited in [CWSB02] of modularization in support of these competing interests is the decision to use codepoints in the IP header to select QoS, rather than binding QoS to other properties such as port numbers. This separates the structural and economic issues related to QoS from technical issues of protocols and port numbers, and allows space for a wide range of structural and pricing solutions to emerge.
Designing for Choice
Is the protocol designed for choice, to allow different players to express their preferences?
10.1. Discussion: the importance of choice
[CWSB02] suggests that "the fundamental design goal of the Internet is to hook computers together, and since computers are used for unpredictable and evolving purposes, making sure that the users are not constrained in what they can do is doing nothing more than preserving the core design tenet of the Internet. In this context, user empowerment is a basic building block, and should be embedded into all mechanism whenever possible."
As an example of choice, "the design of the mail system allows the user to select his SMTP server and his POP server" [CWSB02] . More open-ended questions about choice concern the design of mechanisms that would enable the user to choose the path at the level of providers, or to allow users to choose third-party intermediaries such as web caches, or providers for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES).
[CWSB02] also notes that the issue of choice itself reflects competing interests. For example, ISPs would generally like to lock in customers, while customers would like to preserve their ability to change among providers.
11. Weighing architectural benefits against architectural costs. possible complications with asymmetric routing or mobile hosts. RFC 3135 carefully considers these possible costs, the mitigations that can be introduced, and the cases when the benefits of performanceenhancing proxies to the user are likely to outweight the costs.
Case Study: Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES)
One of the issues raised by middleboxes in the Internet involves the end-to-end integrity of data. This is illustrated in the recent question of chartering the Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) Working Group. Open Pluggable Edge Services are services that would be deployed as application-level intermediaries in the network, for example, at a web proxy cache between the origin server and the client. These intermediaries would transform or filter content, with the explicit consent of either the content provider or the end user.
One of the architectural issues that arose in the process of chartering the OPES Working Group concerned the end-to-end integrity of data. As an example, it was suggested that ''OPES would reduce both the integrity, and the perception of integrity, of communications over the Internet, and would significantly increase uncertainly about what might have been done to content as it moved through the network'', and that therefore the risks of OPES outweighed the benefits [CDT01].
As one consequence of this debate, the IAB wrote a document on "IAB Architectural and Policy Considerations for OPES", considering both the potential architectural benefits and costs of OPES [RFC3238] . This document did not recommend specific solutions or mandate specific functional requirements, but instead included recommendations of issues such as concerns about data integrity that OPES solutions standardized in the IETF should be required to address.
11.3. Case Study: Stresses on DNS.
As an example, over and over again, we find people wanting to overload the DNS with new services and functions. In each case, we may ask whether or not it is feasible to add a particular feature, and often the answer is yes. What we rarely ask is the impact of all this added functionality on the provision of the original service.
[K02] considers many of the newer demands being placed upon the DNS, and [CA02] discusses the general dangers of functional overloading and of unlimited protocol extensions. 12. Looking at the whole picture vs. making a building block.
For a complex protocol which interacts with protocols from other standards bodies as well as from other IETF working groups, it can be necessary to keep in mind the overall picture while, at the same time, breaking out specific parts of the problem to be standardized in particular working groups.
Question: Have you considered the larger context, while restricting your own design efforts to one part of the whole?
Question: Are there parts of the overall solution that will have to be provided by other IETF Working Groups or by other standards bodies?
12.1. Case Study: The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC2543] , for managing connected, multimedia sessions, is an example of a complex protocol that has been broken into pieces for standardization in other working groups. SIP has also involved interaction with other standardization bodies.
The basic SIP framework is being standardized by the SIP working group. This working group has focused on the core functional features of setting up, managing, and tearing down multimedia sessions. Extensions are considered if they relate to these core features.
The task of setting up a multimedia session also requires a description of the desired multimedia session. This is provided by the Session Description Protocol (SDP). SDP is a building block that is supplied by the Multiparty Multimedia Session Control (MMUSIC) working group. It is not standardized within the SIP working group.
Other working groups are involved in standardizing extensions to SIP that fall outside of core functional features or applications. The SIPPING working group is analyzing the requirements for SIP applied to different tasks, and the SIMPLE working group is examining the application of SIP to instant messaging and presence. The IPTEL working group is defining a call processing language (CPL) that interacts with SIP in various ways. These working groups occasionally feed requirements back into the main SIP working group.
Finally, outside standardization groups have been very active in providing the SIP working group with requirements. The Distributed Call Signaling (DCS) group from the PacketCable Consortium, 3GPP, and 3GPP2 are all using SIP for various telephony-related applications, and members of these groups have been involved in drafting requirements for SIP. In addition, there are extensions of SIP which are under consideration in these standardization bodies that are not appropriate material for IETF, because they are not generally applicable but only relate to the particular application of SIP being developed by the standardization bodies. An example is particular interactions with accounting and billing for mobile telephony.
Preserving evolvability?
Does the protocol protect the interests of the future, by preserving the evolvability of the Internet? Does the protocol enable future developments?
13.1. Discussion: evolvability.
There is an extensive literature and an ongoing discussion about the evolvability, or lack of evolvability, of the Internet infrastructure; the web page on "Papers on the Evolvability of the Internet Infrastructure" has pointers to some of this literature [Evolvability] . Issues range from the evolvability and overloading of the DNS; the difficulties of the Internet in evolving to incorporate multicast, QoS, or IPv6; the difficulties of routing in meeting the demands of a changing and expanding Internet; and the role of firewalls and other middleboxes in limiting evolvability.
[CWSB02] suggests that among all of the issues of evolvability, "keeping the net open and transparent for new applications is the most important goal." In the beginning, the relative transparency of the infrastructure in transmitting packets from one end-node to another was sufficient to ensure evolvability. However, this transparency has become more murky over time, as cataloged in [RFC3234] .
[CWSB02] also realistically suggests the following guideline: "Failures of transparency will occur -design what happens then." Thus, maintaining evolvability also requires mechanisms for allowing evolution in the face of a lack of transparency of the infrastructure itself.
Conclusions
This document, in progress, suggests general architectural and policy questions to be addressed in our work in the IETF. We would welcome feedback on this document. Feedback could be send to the editor, Sally Floyd, at floyd@icir.org.
Security Considerations
This document does not propose any new protocols, and therefore does not involve any security considerations in that sense. However, throughout this document there are discussions of the privacy and integrity issues and the architectural requirements created by those issues.
IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations regarding this document. 
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